






The International Trade Administration of the United States Depart-
ment of Commerce (Commerce) has proposed new regulations that would
implement the Trade and Tariff Act of 1984, codify existing practice, and
in some instances, change existing practice. I If adopted, these regulations
would be the most comprehensive changes to the antidumping and coun-
tervailing duty regulations in six years. This article describes both existing
procedures and the proposed changes.
Before delving into Commerce procedures, a brief review of the frame-
work of the antidumping and countervailing duty laws is in order. The
antidumping laws allow for a remedy when a product is being sold in the
United States at a price less than its fair value and imports of that product
are causing material injury to a domestic industry. 2 The countervailing
duty laws provide redress when a product sold in the United States is
subsidized and imports of that product are causing material injury to a
*O'Melveny & Myers; Deputy Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Import Administra-
tion, 1981-1983; J.D. Yale Law School 1973.
**O'Melveny & Myers; J.D. Harvard Law School 1981.
t The Editorial Reviewer for this article was C. Paul Rogers Ill, Professor of Law, South-
ern Methodist University.
I. Countervailing Duty Regulations, 50 Fed. Reg. 24,207-234 (1985) (to be codified at 19
C.F.R. pt. 355) (proposed June 10, 1985); Antidumping Regulations, 51 Fed. Reg. 29,046-
074 (1986) (to be codified at 19 C.F.R. pt. 353) (proposed Aug. 13, 1986). It appears unlikely
that the proposed regulations will be made final in 1987.
2. 19 U.S.C. § 1673 (1982 & Supp. 11 1984).
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domestic industry.3 Commerce determines whether a product is being
dumped or subsidized, as the case may be, and the International Trade
Commission (the Commission) decides whether the imported product is
causing material injury to a domestic industry. This article discusses only
Commerce's procedures. Since these regulations most directly affect the
respondent, this article discusses their impact on respondents. However,
petitioner's counsel also should follow developments regarding these pro-
cedures, but with opposite goals, of course.
. In general, the antidumping and countervailing duty procedures are
parallel both under existing and proposed Commerce regulations. When
provisions are parallel, the antidumping regulations are used for illustration.
I. Initiation
Antidumping and countervailing duty proceedings commence when a
private party files a petition4 or Commerce self-initiates an investigation. 5
Most investigations begin with the filing of a petition by a private party.
Following such a filing, Commerce must decide whether to initiate an
investigation. The Department must make this decision twenty days after
receipt of a petition. 6
Three important issues the respondent must consider during the initi-
ation phase are: (1) how Commerce will define the scope of the investi-
gation; (2) whether the petitioner has standing; and (3) whether to attempt
preinitiation contact.
3. Id. § 1671(a). In addition to providing a remedy for sales that cause material injury,
the antidumping and countervailing duty laws provide remedies for likely sales and sales
that threaten material injury. Id. 8H 1671(a)(1), 1673. The Trade and Tariff Act of 1984 added
language specifically including likely sales within the scope of the trade laws, but Commerce
had discretion to consider likely sales prior to 1984. H.R. REP. No. 725, 98th Cong., 2d
Sess. II, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG & ADMIN. NEWS 5137-38. The proposed
regulations would limit Commerce's consideration of likely sales to instances where there
is an irrevocable offer. 50 Fed. Reg. 24,218 (1985) (to be codified at 19 C.F.R. § 355.2(p));
51 Fed. Reg. 29,057 (1986) (to be codified at 19 C.F.R. § 353.2(t)). The legislative intent in
amending the trade laws to include likely sales was not limited to irrevocable offers, however.
H.R. REP. No. 725, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. II, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS 5127, 5137 ("Section 101 of H.R. 4787 clarifies the applicability of countervailing
duty law to situations where a product has been or is likely to be sold for importation but
has not actually been imported.").
4. 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671a(b), 1673a(b) (1982 & Supp. II 1984). The proposed regulations
would require a private party to provide information in a petition not required under present
law, including the percentage of total exports to the United States accounted for by persons
believed to be selling dumped or subsidized merchandise. 50 Fed. Reg. 24,219 (1985) (to be
codified at 19 C.F.R. § 355.12(b)(6)); 51 Fed. Reg. 29,059 (1986) (to be codified at 19 C.F.R.
§ 353.12(b)(6)). The petitioner should be wary of antitrust problems in securing information
on the market share of its foreign competitors.
5. 19 U.S.C. 88 1671a(a), 1673a(a)(I) (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
6. Id. H§ 1671a(c), 1673a(c) (1982).
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A. SCOPE OF THE INVESTIGATION
In the notice of initiation, Commerce defines the scope of the investi-
gation. 7 Because of the prohibition on preinitiation communication, 8 a
respondent has no input into this important decision.
The scope of investigation regulations, both existing and proposed, are
circular. Commerce's scope of investigation determination turns on the
Commission's "like product" definition (i.e., what U.S. product is "like"
the imported product), 9 and the "like product" definition, which is often
a hotly contested issue, is not resolved until the Commission's final de-
termination. Thus, Commerce cannot properly define the scope of inves-
tigation until it completes the investigation.
The explanation of the proposed regulations notes that Commerce would
consult the Commission regarding the "like product" definition,' 0 as is
the current practice. Nevertheless, these consultations are often pro forma,
and the two agencies sometimes reach inconsistent conclusions.'
B. STANDING
Many respondents are aggressively pursuing standing issues in an area
of rapidly evolving trade law. For a petitioner to have standing, it must
(I) be an interested party, 12 and (2) file the petition on behalf of an in-
dustry.1 3 Many questions have arisen as to who must establish whether
a petition is filed on behalf of an industry: the petitioner, the respondent,
Commerce, or the Commission? In Gilmore Steel Corp. v. United States 14
the court said the petitioner "must show that a majority of [the] industry
7. The description of merchandise in the petition guides Commerce in defining the scope
of the investigation, but it is not necessarily controlling under either existing or proposed
regulations. See 50 Fed. Reg. 24,209 (1985); 51 Fed. Reg. 29,048 (1986).
8. As discussed infra in notes 21-26 and accompanying text, the prohibition on preinitia-
tion communication is not absolute in that a consultation between the United States and a
government alleged to be providing subsidies is required by the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade.
9. 19 U.S.C. § 1677(4)(A) (Supp. 11 1984).
10. 50 Fed. Reg. 24,208 (1985); 51 Fed. Reg. 29,046 (1986).
II. See, e.g., Certain Valves, Couplings, Nozzles and Connections of Brass, Suitable for
Use in Interior Fire Protection Systems, from Italy, 49 Fed. Reg. 47,066 (Dep't Comm.
1984) (final determination), in which Commerce found a single industry, and the Commission
found seven industries, two of which were materially injured. Id. at 47,071. In Badger-
Powhatan, Div. of Figgie v. United States, 608 F. Supp. 653, 655 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1985), the
plaintiff challenged Commerce's directive to the U.S. Customs Service to assess a duty
only on products subject to the Commission's affirmative injury determinations. The plain-
tiff's action to compel Commerce to expand the scope of the antidumping order was dis-
missed. Id. at 658.
12. 19 U.S.C. § 1677(9) (1982 & Supp. I1 1984).
13. Id. §§ 1671a(b)(I), 1673a(b)(l) (1982).
14. 585 F. Supp. 670, 676 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1984).
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backs its petition." Commerce takes the position that the respondent has
the burden of establishing that the petitioner has not filed on behalf of an
industry. 15 However, the respondent usually has no means to gather in-
formation on industry support of the petition,' 6 and thus Commerce's
position effectively squelches the issue. Indeed, Commerce itself has no
means to measure accurately the degree of industry support (except for
highly concentrated industries), and it usually refuses to try to gather
information in any event. 1 7
In practice, the International Trade Commission gathers information
on domestic industry support of the petition. The Commission sends
questionnaires to domestic producers, inquiring whether the producer
supports the petition. 18 The final tally of industry support is not made
available until the Commission issues its final investigation report, which
usually occurs at least a week after its final determination. Since Com-
merce makes its final determination prior to the Commission's final de-
cision and Commerce is in charge of deciding the standing issue, the data
on standing are generated too late to be useful. Respondents with a stand-
ing issue should press Commerce and the Commission to gather the ap-
propriate information in a timely fashion.
The proposed regulations would limit the period within which the re-
spondent could raise standing allegations. The proposed rules would impose
a deadline of ten days before Commerce's preliminary determination.19
In imposing a ten-day deadline Commerce ignores the possibility that
facts could change. For example, a company accounting for a significant
volume of U.S. production could reverse its position. Furthermore, courts
are not likely to uphold this arbitrary cut-off in view of the language in
15. See, e.g., Certain Textile Mill Products and Apparel from Malaysia, 50 Fed. Reg.
9852, 9853 (Dep't Comm. 1985) (final determination), where this position was first articulated.
16. Members of the domestic industry presumably would not respond to a questionnaire
from a respondent. In theory, a respondent is not even aware of an antidumping petition
until after initiation, because the Antidumping Code of the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade contains an agreement not to publicize petitions until the initiation notice. Com-
mittee on Anti-dumping Practices (Nov. 15, 1983), GATT BISD, 3d Supp. 24, 25 (1984). A
respondent would be aware of a countervailing duty petition prior to initiation because of
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade consultation requirement, discussed infra notes
124-25.
17. In Gilmore Commerce had actively sought statements of opposition to the petition.
In two recent investigations Commerce took steps to gather information on standing. In
Certain Textile Mill Products, 50 Fed. Reg. 9852, 9853 (Dep't Comm. 1985) (negative final
determination), and Frozen Concentrated Orange Juice from Brazil, 51 Fed. Reg. 8324-26
(Dep't Comm. 1987) (affirmative final determination), Commerce sent standing question-
naires to companies.
18. See, e.g., the Commission's questionnaire in Candles from the People's Republic of
China, Inv. No. 731-TA-282 (Final) (May 30, 1986, reply date) at 5.
19. 50 Fed. Reg. 24,230 (1985) (to be codified at 19 C.F.R. § 355.31(c)(2)); 51 Fed. Reg.
29,067 (1986) (to be codified at 19 C.F.R. § 353.31(c)(2)).
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Gilmore that Commerce can rescind at any time for lack of industry
support.20
C. PREINITIATION CONTACT
Often the respondent has arguments it wishes to bring to Commerce's
attention regarding why the petition should not be initiated, such as the
lack of standing, or how the scope of the investigation should be defined.
United States v. Roses, Inc.2 1 holds, however, that a respondent cannot
have preinitiation contact with Commerce. In practice, however, some
respondents try to make oral arguments to Commerce. Furthermore, a
respondent sometimes submits documents, which Commerce returns. No
sanctions are imposed if the respondent engages in preinitiation contact,
although in such circumstances the possibility exists that a Commerce
determination would be invalidated in a court of law (which the respondent
would generally favor). A respondent, therefore, risks little by attempting
preinitiation contact, provided, of course, that the respondent is careful
not to provoke Commerce officials.
The proposed antidumping regulations would prohibit communication
from an "interested party" prior to initiation. 22 An "interested party"
would include producers, exporters, and importers. 23 Thus, while the
explanation of the regulations states that the prohibition against pre-
initiation contact is to limit communication between Commerce and "per-
sons that might be respondents," 24 the prohibition would include the
petitioner and other parties in support of the petition.
2 5
20. The Gilmore court found that Commerce was empowered to make a correction in its
standing finding and rescind its earlier initiation based on that finding. 585 F. Supp. at 674.
"To require the ITA to continue an obviously unwarranted investigation, simply because
material inaccuracies in the petition do not come to its attention until after the expiration
of the 20-day period, flies in the face of reason." Id.
21. 706 F.2d 1563 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
22. 51 Fed. Reg. 29,059 (1986) (to be codified at 19 C.F.R. § 353.12(i)). The proposed
countervailing duty regulations make an exception to the prohibition on pre-initiation contact
for consultation with the government of the affected country as required by art. 3(l) of the
Agreement on Interpretation and Application of articles VI, XVI and XXIII of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Apr. 12, 1979, 31 U.S.T. 513, 522, T.I.A.S. No. 9619, GATT
BisD, 26th Supp. 56 (1980) (entered into force Jan. I, 1980), commonly referred to as the
Subsidies Code. 50 Fed. Reg. 24,220 (1985) (to be codified at 19 C.F.R. § 355.12(j)(2)). It
is difficult to see how Roses can be squared with the permissible Subsidies Code consultation
except by drawing a narrow distinction based on the fact that Roses involved a dumping
case.
23. 50 Fed. Reg. 24,217 (1985) (to be codified at 19 C.F.R. § 355.2(i)(1)); 51 Fed. Reg.
29,057 (1986) (to be codified at 19 C.F.R. § 353.2(k)(1)).
24. 51 Fed. Reg. 29,048 (1986).
25. Under the proposed regulations, if the petitioner were not an "interested party," it
could not be a "party to the proceeding" since only interested parties qualify as parties to
the proceeding. 50 Fed. Reg. 24,218 (1985) (to be codified at 19 C.F.R. § 355.2(1)); 51 Fed.
Reg. 29,057 (1986) (to be codified at 19 C.F.R. § 353.2(o)).
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Commerce's proposed absolute prohibition on the receipt of oral or
written preinitiation communication goes too far. At the very least, Com-
merce should leave itself the option to request information in order to
fulfill its mandate under Roses "not only to examine the petition and
supporting data for internal consistencies, but also to evaluate it in light
of a wide body of other information to the end that, so far as possible,
the commencement of unwarranted investigations should be avoided." 26
II. Investigation
After initiation, Commerce begins its investigation through the Office
of Investigations of the Import Administration. Commerce makes its pre-
liminary determination of the dumping margin 160 days after the filing of
the petition 27 but may extend this period to 210 days if it determines that
the case is "extraordinarily complicated." 28 If the preliminary determi-
nation is affirmative, Commerce orders suspension of liquidation, 29 to
become effective on the date the preliminary determination is published
in the Federal Register. 30 After suspension of liquidation, the importer
must post a bond or cash deposit in the amount of the estimated subsidy
or dumping margin. 31
Whether the preliminary determination is affirmative or negative, the
investigation proceeds to a final determination. 32 Commerce makes the
final determination within 75 days of the preliminary determination 33 but
can extend the period to 135 days at either the petitioner's request (in the
case of a negative determination) 34 or the exporter's request (in the case
of an affirmative determination). 35 The proposed regulations would change
the deadline for the final determination from 75 days after Commerce's
26. 706 F.2d at 1569. The court also noted that since the regulations have no provision
for extending the initiation deadline, "[i]f, as the end of the period approaches [Commerce]
does not know whether to say yes or no, but only maybe, it has to say no in order to
preserve its position." Id.
27. 19 U.S.C. § 1673b(b) (1982).
28. Id. § 1673b(c). For countervailing duty cases, the preliminary determination is due
45 days after the filing of the petition, id. § 1671b(b)(l) (Supp. 11 1984), but may be extended
to 150 days in an "extraordinarily complicated" case, id. § 167 lb(c)(1) (1982). The petitioner,
but not the respondent, can request a postponement. Id. §§ 167lb(c)(l)(A), 1673b(c)(l)(A).
29. No suspension of liquidation will result if the preliminary determination is negative.
30. Id. §§ 1671b(d)(l), 1673b(d)(1) (1982).
31. Id. §§ 167lb(d)(2), 1673b(d)(2).
32. Id. §§ 1671d(a)(l), 1673d(a)(l) (1982 & Supp. 11 1984).
33. Id.
34. Id. § 1673d(a)(2)(B) (1982).
35. Id. § 1673d(a)(2)(A). A final determination in a countervailing duty case is due 75
days after the preliminary determination. Id. § 167ld(a)(l) (Supp. 11 1984). Commerce may
not extend the deadline although a complex countervailing duty case would seem to compel
an extension at least as much as a complex antidumping case.
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preliminary determination to 75 days after the date of publication of Com-
merce's preliminary determination. 36 Thus, the new rules leave the pos-
sibility that Commerce could extend the final determination by a delay in
sending the preliminary determination to the Federal Register for publi-
cation. The delay could provide extra time to negotiate a settlement. In
any event, since publication is generally several days to one week after
the preliminary determination, the proposed regulation would effectively
extend investigations.
A. EXCLUSION REQUEST
Under the present regulations, Commerce may exclude a manufacturer,
producer, or exporter from the investigation upon request if all examined
exports (usually 100 percent of exports) during the period of investigation
were made at prices not less than fair value.37 Commerce must exclude
a firm not benefiting from subsidies. 38
The proposed regulations would reduce the number of exclusion re-
quests. First, Commerce would not have to consider an exclusion request.
The proposed regulations state that Commerce will investigate exclusion
requests "to the extent practicable." '39
Second, under the proposed rules, exclusion requests would have to
be filed thirty days after publication of the notice of initiation.40 While
Commerce presently imposes a thirty-day time limit for countervailing
duty cases, it has no specific deadline for dumping cases.41 A company,
within thirty days after initiation, cannot analyze all sales over a six-
month period to determine if there is a dumping margin unless the com-
pany had very few or no sales during that period. In addition, the existence
of subsidies cannot be evaluated properly. Thus, the thirty-day time limit
imposes an unrealistic deadline.
Third, if there are subsidy allegations, the foreign government would
be required to provide within thirty days after publication of initiation a
certification that the company received no subsidies. 42 This proposed
regulation would create problems. Foreign governments often have no
single agency able to make such certifications, especially if petitioner has
36. 50 Fed. Reg. 24,224 (1985) (to be codified at 19 C.F.R. § 355.20(a)); 51 Fed. Reg.
29,063 (1986) (to be codified at 19 C.F.R. § 353.20(a)).
37. Id. § 353.45 (1986).
38. Id. § 355.38.
39. 50 Fed. Reg. 24,220 (1985) (to be codified at 19 C.F.R. § 355.14(c)); 51 Fed. Reg.
29,060 (1986) (to be codified at 19 C.F.R. § 353.14(c)).
40. 50 Fed. Reg. 24,220 (1985) (to be codified at 19 C.F.R. § 355.14(a)); 51 Fed. Reg.
29,059 (1986) (to be codified at 19 C.F.R. § 353.14(a)).
41. 19 C.F.R. §§ 355.38, 353.45 (1986).
42. 50 Fed. Reg. 24,220 (1985) (to be codified at 19 C.F.R. § 355.14(b)(2)).
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alleged that programs administered by many different agencies constitute
subsidies. Furthermore, unless foreign governments act more quickly than
the U.S. government, it would take considerably longer than thirty days
to identify potential subsidy programs and ascertain if a certain company
received a subsidy. For that matter, few foreign governments accept the
U.S. definition of subsidy, and many would be reluctant to accept it
implicitly through a certification process.
Fourth, under the proposed countervailing duty regulations, if the ap-
plication of Commerce methodology would result in a subsidy, Commerce
would penalize the company even though the company had certified that
by applying its methodology it received no subsidy. The company would
receive the greater of its individual rate or the countrywide rate. 43 Thus,
application of the new rules results in too harsh a penalty.
Fifth, the proposed regulations provide that countervailing duty and
dumping exclusion requests would be "irrevocable." 44 Making such re-
quests irrevocable is in no one's best interest. For example, suppose a
company in good faith certified that it received no subsidy. Subsequently,
the firm discovered the receipt of a subsidy. The company could not
revoke its exclusion request although a revocation would be both in Com-
merce's best interest (it could identify and countervail a subsidy) and in
the company's best interest (it would not be penalized by having the
greater of its individual rate or the countrywide rate applied).
B. CRITICAL CIRCUMSTANCES
Prior to Commerce's preliminary determination and possible suspen-
sion of liquidation, importers try to get as much product into the United
States as possible. If too large an amount of product is imported prior to
the preliminary determination, a finding of critical circumstances could
result. To make an affirmative critical circumstances finding, Commerce
must find "massive imports" over a "relatively short period," in which
case Commerce directs the U.S. Customs Service (Customs) to make the
suspension of liquidation ninety days retroactive .45 Of course, if Customs
already has liquidated duties, the ninety-day retroactive suspension of
liquidation will have no effect.
In the past, uncertainty has arisen as to what volume constitutes "mas-
sive imports" over a "relatively short period." As to the definition of
"massive imports," the proposed regulations would codify the present
Commerce practice of considering an increase of fifteen percent or more
43. 50 Fed. Reg. 24,225 (1985) (to be codified at 19 C.F.R. § 355.20(e)).
44. 50 Fed. Reg. 24,220 (1985) (to be codified at 19 C.F.R. § 355.14(a)); 51 Fed. Reg.
29,059 (1986) (to be codified at 19 C.F.R. § 353.14(a)).
45. 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671b(e)(2), 1673b(e)(2) (1982).
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a "massive increase." 46 To calculate an increase of fifteen percent, how-
ever, Commerce must establish a base period for comparison, and the
proposed regulations do not address this issue. The new rules merely state
that the fifteen percent increase is "over the imports during an immedi-
ately preceding period of comparable duration." 47 Thus, what constitutes
"massive imports" would remain unclear.
Regarding the definition of a "relatively short period," the proposed
regulations define the term as running from the date of initiation to the
date of suspension of liquidation or to an earlier period if the respondents
had reason to believe a petition was about to be filed. 48 This definition
has two problems.
First, the proposed regulations state that the deadline for alleging critical
circumstances is twenty-one days before Commerce's final determina-
tion. 49 Since in a normal investigation only seventy-five days elapse be-
tween the preliminary and final determinations, and the lag in import
statistics is often at least two months, the petitioners probably would not
know if critical circumstances exist prior to the deadline for making the
allegation. Therefore, petitioners would routinely allege critical circum-
stances, adding to Commerce's workload and forcing respondents to de-
velop a defense. 50
Second, under the proposed regulations, the "relatively short period"
would commence when respondents had reason to know of the petition. 51
Therefore, the petitioner would have an incentive continually to publicize
the preparation of a petition so that imports would not increase. Such a
strategy could in some circumstances be found a violation of the antitrust
laws, 52 but the proposed regulation presents the possibility for abuse.
46. 50 Fed. Reg. 24,222 (1985) (to be codified at 19 C.F.R. § 355.16(f)); 51 Fed. Reg.
29,061 (1986) (to be codified at 19 C.F.R. § 353.16(f)(2)). The explanation of the proposed
regulations states that Commerce has discretion to find critical circumstances even when
the increase in imports is less than 15%. 50 Fed. Reg. 24,210 (1985); 51 Fed. Reg. 29,049
(1986).
47. 50 Fed. Reg. 24,222 (1985) (to be codified at 19 C.F.R. § 355.16(f)); 51 Fed. Reg.
29,061 (1986) (to be codified at 19 C.F.R. § 353.16(f)(2)).
48. 50 Fed. Reg. 24,222 (1985) (to be codified at 19 C.F.R. § 355.16(g)); 51 Fed. Reg.
29,061 (1986) (to be codified at 19 C.F.R. § 353.16(g)).
49. 50 Fed. Reg. 24,221 (1985) (to be codified at 19 C.F.R. § 355.16(a)); 51 Fed. Reg.
29,060 (1986) (to be codified at 19 C.F.R. § 353.16(a)).
50. Although with a 21-day deadline the petitioner might not have import data up to the
date of the preliminary determination prior to having to decide whether to allege critical
circumstances, a deadline closer to the date of the final determination might not allow
Commerce adequate time to analyze the data and draft a decision.
51. 50 Fed. Reg. 24,222 (1985) (to be codified at 19 C.F.R. § 355.16(g)); 51 Fed. Reg.
29,061 (1986) (to be codified at 19 C.F.R. § 353.16(g)).
52. For example, if co-petitioners publicized the anticipated filing of a petition to chill
vigorous import competition, that action might be construed as restraining trade.
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C. QUESTIONNAIRES
In both antidumping and countervailing duty investigations, Commerce
uses questionnaires as its primary means of gathering information. In
antidumping investigations, foreign producers of the like product receive
the questionnaires. Commerce must investigate producers who account
for sixty percent of the dollar volume 53 of U.S. imports. 54 Commerce
often takes advantage of the sixty percent rule to decrease its workload.
In countervailing duty investigations, Commerce presents the question-
naire to the foreign government. Although the sixty percent rule does not
apply to countervailing duty cases, Commerce has on occasion sent ques-
tionnaires to companies accounting for sixty percent of U.S. imports. 55
The period for which Commerce requests data varies for dumping and
countervailing duty investigations. Antidumping questionnaires usually
request data for all sales of the product in question for a period of at least
150 days prior to and 30 days after the first day of the month during which
Commerce received the petition.56 Countervailing duty questionnaires
request information on potential subsidy programs covering several years. 57
Commerce requests information for several years, because, under its
methodology for calculating subsidies, a subsidy granted in one year can
have a benefit for many years thereafter. In both antidumping and coun-
tervailing duty investigations, Commerce often issues a second question-
naire after the investigators have had the opportunity to analyze the initial
response. The second questionnaire, referred to as a "supplemental ques-
tionnaire" or a "deficiency letter," requests further information and
clarifications.
If a company submits a response that is timely, accurate, and complete,
Commerce generally will consider it even though it is unsolicited. Never-
theless, Commerce has recently tried to discourage voluntary responses
by stating that it might not review them. 58 Under the proposed anti-
dumping and countervailing duty regulations, Commerce "normally will
53. Under the proposed regulations, Commerce would examine sales accounting for 60%
of the dollar volume or value of the merchandise sold in the period of investigation. 51 Fed.
Reg. 29,071 (1986) (to be codified at 19 C.F.R. § 353.42(b)).
54. 19 C.F.R. § 353.38(a) (1986).
55. See, e.g., Certain Table Wine from France, 50 Fed. Reg. 40,580 (Dep't Comm. 1985)
(initiation).
56. 19 C.F.R. § 353.38(a) (1986).
57. See, e.g., Certain Fresh Atlantic Groundfish from Canada, Inv. C-122-507 (question-
naire dated Sept. 9, 1985).
58. Commerce claims it may legally refuse to review voluntary responses, because no
duties are actually collected until the administrative review, although companies of course
would suffer the very real commercial burden of an antidumping order in the interim. In
practical terms, Commerce can get rid of an unwelcome "voluntary" response by finding
a deficiency in the response and thus justifying its failure to consider it.
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not consider or retain in the record of the proceeding unsolicited ques-
tionnaire responses." 59 Therefore, if a manufacturer is not dumping or
receiving a subsidy, but it misses the exclusion deadline and is not sent
a questionnaire, Commerce will likely assess a duty against the manu-
facturer for a minimum of four years if it finds a margin for the sixty
percent of sales investigated. 60
D. STRATEGY FOR RESPONDING TO QUESTIONNAIRES
A respondent's questionnaire response can win or lose the case. There-
fore, both petitioner and respondent should work with the Commerce
investigator to make sure the appropriate questions are asked. At the
earliest opportunity, the respondent should analyze Commerce question-
naires used in previous investigations to determine what revisions should
be made for the investigation at hand. Comments on the questionnaire
should be given to the investigator as soon as possible since the inves-
tigator begins working on the questionnaire even before the case is ini-
tiated. When the investigator completes a draft of the questionnaire, he
usually will give a copy of it to the petitioner and respondent for their
comments.
The respondent and petitioner will find that answering the questionnaire
is a huge undertaking. 61 At the commencement of the investigation, the
team that will prepare the response needs to be identified and briefed.
Preparation of the response should begin no later than the date of receipt
of the draft questionnaire. The respondent cannot afford to wait until it
receives the official questionnaire to start preparing its reply, because the
response is generally due thirty days after receipt, 62 although two-week
extensions may be granted. 63 If a questionnaire is not submitted on time,
59. 50 Fed. Reg. 24,230 (1985) (to be codified at 19 C.F.R. § 355.31(b)(2)); 51 Fed. Reg.
29,067 (1986) (to be codified at 19 C.F.R. § 353.31(b)(2)).
60. See the discussion of administrative reviews, infra notes 115-34 and accompanying
text.
61. Responding to the questionnaire will become even more burdensome if a proposed
regulation is adopted requiring every document submitted to be translated into English. 50
Fed. Reg. 24,230 (1985) (to be codified at 19 C.F.R. § 355.31(f)); 51 Fed. Reg. 29,068 (1986)
(to be codified at 19 C.F.R. § 353.31(f)). At present, some technical documents need not
be translated, especially if the investigator knows the foreign language.
62. No regulatory deadline is imposed for questionnaire responses in investigations under
either existing or proposed regulations. Under proposed regulations for administrative re-
views, however, the questionnaire response deadline would be 60 days after receipt. 50 Fed.
Reg. 24,230 (1985) (to be codified at 19 C.F.R. § 355.31(b)(4)); 51 Fed. Reg. 29,067 (1986)
(to be codified at 19 C.F.R. § 353.31(b)(4)).
63. In investigations where Commerce requests data to answer allegations that mer-
chandise is being sold below the cost of production, the response deadline is routinely
extended from 30 to 45 days upon request. Under the proposed regulations, there ordinarily
would be no extensions. 50 Fed. Reg. 24,230 (1985) (to be codified at 19 C.F.R. § 355.3 1(b)(3));
51 Fed. Reg. 29,067 (1986) (to be codified at 19 C.F.R., § 353.31(b)(3)).
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Commerce may use the best information available, which is often that
contained in the petition, 64 as the basis for its determination.
E. AcCESS TO CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION
In dealing with confidentiality, the respondent must consider two issues:
what information must be released (1) to the public and (2) under an
administrative protective order (APO).
The proposed regulations would require more information to be released
to the public than under prior rules. They would define narrowly the term
"confidential information" and make public certain information that often
has been accorded confidential treatment, including channels of distri-
bution and the destination of sales. 65 Disclosure of channels of distribution
and the destination of sales would be damaging to a respondent who has
been developing new markets unbeknownst to its U.S. competitors.
The proposed regulations also would require more information to be
released to the public by requiring data reported in the public version of
a document to be ranged within ten percent of the actual figures. 66 Al-
though requirements for ranging data presently exist, 67 Commerce often
does not require ranging when data are voluminous. Under the proposed
regulations, ranging would be required for one percent of voluminous
data.68 While Commerce's objective of disclosing as much information
as possible is laudatory, the ranged data requirement could allow a re-
spondent to get a very good idea of a competing respondent's operations.
In the past, Commerce has scrupulously protected one competitor's data
from falling into the hands of'another competitor.69 The new ranging
requirement will not benefit the petitioner in the investigation, because
the petitioner's counsel has access to the actual, not ranged, data under
an APO.
In addition to providing for the release of more information to the public,
the proposed regulations would facilitate the release of information under
64. 19 C.F.R. §§ 355.39(b), 353.51(b) (1986). The proposed regulations would change the
standard from "best information available" to "available information." 50 Fed. Reg. 24,220-
21 (1985) (to be codified at 19 C.F.R. § 355.15(a)(1)); 51 Fed. Reg. 29,060 (1986) (to be
codified at 19 C.F.R. § 353.15(a)(1)). Presumably, Commerce would continue to use the
"best" available information.
65. 50 Fed. Reg. 24,218 (1985) (to be codified at 19 C.F.R. § 355.4(b)(3), (6)); 51 Fed.
Reg. 29,058 (1986) (to be codified at 19 C.F.R. § 353.4(b)(3), (6)).
66. 50 Fed. Reg. 24,230 (1985) (to be codified at 19 C.F.R. § 355.32(b)(1)); 51 Fed. Reg.
29,068 (1986) (to be codified at 19 C.F.R. § 353.32(b)(1)).
67. 19 C.F.R. §§ 355.18(a)(1), 353.28(a)(1) (1986).
68. 50 Fed. Reg. 24,230 (1985) (to be codified at 19 C.F.R. § 355.32(b)(1)); 51 Fed. Reg.
29,068 (1986) (to be codified at 19 C.F.R. § 353.32(b)(1)).
69. A respondent can never obtain access to a competitor's questionnaire response.
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APOs. At present, the respondent may try to delay petitioner's access to
potentially releasable information by construing broadly what data can
be withheld. Under the proposed regulations, the release of confidential
information under an APO would be almost automatic. An APO request,
to be submitted on a standard form, would be due ten days after the later
of the date that one becomes a party or that the notice of initiation is
published. In no event could an APO request be submitted later than ten
days before the date of publication of the preliminary determination. 70
The form would allow a party to request both information already sub-
mitted and information not yet submitted. 71 By proposing to provide APO
forms covering information "not yet submitted," Commerce presumes
material is releasable. 72
Under current practice, if a respondent believes data are not releasable
but the petitioner disagrees, the petitioner will complain to Commerce,
and Commerce then will make a confidentiality ruling and set a deadline
for the respondent to agree to release or withdraw the information. 73 This
process usually takes several days. Under the proposed regulations, a
respondent would have only twenty-four hours to disclose or withdraw
the information. 74 A twenty-four hour deadline imposes an unrealistic
time limit because it does not allow counsel time to contact a foreign
client.
The proposed regulations would permit a party to retain information
released under an APO until the expiration of the deadline for filing an
appeal. 75 In addition, they would allow a party to a judicial review to
retain proprietary information provided that the party files for a court
protective order for the information not later than fifteen days after Com-
merce files the administrative record with the Court. 76 Nevertheless,
70. 50 Fed. Reg. 24,231 (1985) (to be codified at 19 C.F.R. § 355.34(b)(1)(ii)); 51 Fed. Reg.
29,069 (1986) (to be codified at 19 C.F.R. § 353.34(b)(1)(ii)).
71. 50 Fed. Reg. 24,231 (1985) (to be codified at 19 C.F.R. § 355.34(b)(2)); 51 Fed. Reg.
29,069 (1986) (to be codified at 19 C.F.R. § 353.34(b)(2)).
72. The proposed regulations are inconsistent with the statutory requirement that infor-
mation requested pursuant to an APO be described "with particularity." 19 U.S.C.
§ 1677f(c)(l)(A)(1982). The authors of the regulations have recognized the inconsistency of
requiring that documents be described with particularity and that they be requested before
they exist. "The regulation recognizes that the standard in Section 777(c) for particularity
of description of requested information must be read in light of the 1984 Act's provision for
requesting information before the Department receives it, or even before the information
exists." 50 Fed. Reg. 24,215 (1985) (to be codified at 19 C.F.R. § 355.34); 51 Fed. Reg.
29,053 (1986) (to be codified at 19 C.F.R. § 353.34).
73. 19 C.F.R. §§ 355.18(c), 353.28(e) (1986).
74. 50 Fed. Reg. 24,231 (1985) (to be codified at 19 C.F.R. § 355.34(c)); 51 Fed. Reg.
29,069 (1986) (to be codified at 19 C.F.R. § 353.34(c)).
75. 50 Fed. Reg. 24,231 (1985) (to be codified at 19 C.F.R. § 355.34(d)(1)); 51 Fed. Reg.
29,069 (1986) (to be codified at 19 C.F.R. § 353.34(d)(1)).
76. 50 Fed. Reg. 24,231 (1985) (to be codified at 19 C.F.R. § 355.34(d)(2)); 51 Fed. Reg.
29,069 (1986) (to be codified at 19 C.F.R. § 353.34(d)(2)).
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Commerce would not release additional proprietary information after
making a judicially reviewable determination according to the explanation
of the regulations. 77 This rule presents an unwise alternative, because it
would force a party to file an appeal to obtain data to determine, for
example, if a dumping margin were calculated correctly. A better solution
would allow Commerce to release its calculations after a final determi-
nation and to issue a revised dumping margin, if errors were discovered,
than to force the parties to go through the added expense of an appeal.
F. VERIFICATION
Because Commerce will verify the responses, respondents should main-
tain careful records of the information that they used to prepare ques-
tionnaire responses. 78 Verification can occur either before or after
Commerce's preliminary determination. In an antidumping verification,
the investigator prepares an outline of matters he will explore during a
visit to the company. 79 He notifies the company that he will verify certain
sales. The company must provide support for each number used to cal-
culate the dumping margins for those particular sales. In addition, the
investigator will verify other sales for which he gives the company no
advance notification. If the company's response cannot be supported,
Commerce will rely on the best information available. 80 In countervailing
duty verifications, as in antidumping verifications, the investigator pre-
pares an outline of matters that will be investigated. He investigates those
and other matters for which he gives no advance notice. The investigator
interviews government officials to ascertain how they administer various
programs and how they compute subsidies. If the investigator discovers
any additional subsidy programs, he may investigate them if time permits. 81
Several weeks after the investigator completes verification, Commerce
issues a report. Under the present regulations, both petitioner and re-
spondent have the opportunity to comment on the verification report.
Under the proposed regulations, Commerce might not allow any com-
ments because the deadline for the submission of factual information
77. 50 Fed. Reg. 24,215 (1985) (to be codified at 19 C.F.R. § 355.34); 51 Fed. Reg. 29,054
(1986) (to be codified at 19 C.F.R. § 353.34).
78. 19 C.F.R. §§ 355.39, 353.51 (1986). However, if there are many respondents, Com-
merce may verify a sample of the responses. This practice would be codified in the proposed
regulations. 50 Fed. Reg. 24,232 (1985) (to be codified at 19 C.F.R. § 355.37(a)(2)); 51 Fed.
Reg. 29,069 (1986) (to be codified at 19 C.F.R. § 353.36(a)(2)).
79. In a countervailing duty case, investigators visit government offices and sometimes
company operations.
80. 19 C.F.R. § 353.51(b) (1986).
81. Id. § 355.43.
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would occur before verification is scheduled to commence. 82 Prohibiting
comment on the verification report would disadvantage everyone: the
petitioner, the respondent, interested parties, and Commerce. If Com-
merce discovers errors made by the respondent, the respondent should
be allowed to submit data correcting those errors. If Commerce made an
error, a better alternative would allow the error to be brought to the
investigator's attention before the final determination rather than on appeal.
G. DISCLOSURE CONFERENCE
After Commerce makes a preliminary determination, both petitioner
and respondent usually request disclosure conferences. Commerce holds
separate conferences for petitioner and respondent. 83 At the conferences,
Commerce discloses the decisions it made on various issues, the rationale
for those decisions, and its dumping margin (or subsidy) calculations. A
respondent should analyze carefully both the policy decisions and cal-
culations disclosed. This analysis becomes the basis for briefs to be pre-
sented in conjunction with the hearing.
H. HEARING
The present regulations provide for a hearing normally within thirty
days after the preliminary determination is published. 84 Briefs are due
one week prior to the hearing. 85 Under the proposed regulations, the
hearing would occur later in the investigation.8 6 The deadline for pre-
hearing briefs would be thirty-five days after publication of a preliminary
determination. 87 The rebuttal brief would be due seven days after the
prehearing brief.88 The proposed regulations do not allow for posthearing
82. For antidumping investigations, the deadline would be seven days before verification
is scheduled to commence. 51 Fed. Reg. 29,067 (1986) (to be codified at 19 C.F.R.
§ 353.31(a)(l)(i)). For countervailing duty investigations, the deadline would be one day
before verification is to begin. 50 Fed. Reg. 24,229 (1985) (to be codified at 19 C.F.R.
§ 355.3 1(a)(1)(i)). Parties could still make telephone calls to Commerce to comment on the
report, but telephone calls are an inadequate substitute for written submissions.
83. If there is more than one respondent, separate disclosure conferences are held for
each respondent. Commerce does not disclose one respondent's data to another's counsel.
84. 19 C.F.R. §§ 355.35, 353.47 (1986).
85. Id.
86. The proposed regulations do not set a time for the hearing in relation to the preliminary
determination, as do the existing regulations, but rather in relation to the rebuttal briefs.
50 Fed. Reg. 24,233 (1985) (to be codified at 19 C.F.R. § 355.39(e)); 51 Fed. Reg. 29,070
(1986) (to be codified at 19 C.F.R. § 353.38(e)).
87. 50 Fed. Reg. 24,232 (1985) (to be codified at 19 C.F.R. § 355.39(b)); 51 Fed. Reg.
29,070 (1986) (to be codified at 19 C.F.R. § 353.38(b)(1)(i)).
88. 50 Fed. Reg. 24,233 (1985) (to be codified at 19 C.F.R. § 355.39(c)); 51 Fed. Reg.
29,070 (1986) (to be codified at 19 C.F.R. § 353.38(c)).
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briefs. Presumably they could be provided. The deadlines that would be
imposed for the brief and rebuttal brief would not allow the parties to
comment on verification. 89
The absence of a provision for posthearing briefs may be attributable
to Commerce's fear that some respondents will not submit a prehearing
brief and will put all arguments in a posthearing brief to which the peti-
tioner cannot respond. A better solution would allow a page limit for
posthearing briefs, such as the ten-page limit set by the International Trade
Commission, 90 than to omit posthearing briefs altogether.
The proposed regulations regarding the service of briefs are welcome.
They would require counsel to serve briefs by overnight mail or courier.
91
Under present regulations, counsel wastes time negotiating for same day
or overnight service.
I. ASSESSMENT OF DUTIES
If both Commerce and the Commission make affirmative final deter-
minations, Commerce issues a countervailing duty or antidumping order.92
Antidumping duty orders are tailored to a specific company. 93 If Com-
merce finds that a company has a dumping margin of less than 0.5 percent,
a de minimis margin, then it is excluded from the order.94 The proposed
regulations leave unclear whether a company with a de minimis margin
would be excluded unless it previously had requested exclusion. 9 5 Coun-
tervailing duty orders are not company-specific; Commerce imposes them
on a countrywide basis absent special circumstances.
96
89. For the specific deadlines, see supra notes 86-88 and accompanying text.
90. 19 C.F.R. § 207.24 (1986).
91. 50 Fed. Reg. 24,233 (1985) (to be codified at 19 C.F.R. § 355.39(d)); 51 Fed. Reg.
29,070 (1986) (to be codified at 19 C.F.R. § 353.38(d)).
92. 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671d(c)(2), 1673d(c)(2) (1982). A cash deposit, bond, or other security
is required after publication of Commerce's preliminary determination. Id. §§ 167 1b(d)(2),
1673b(d)(2).
93. 19 C.F.R. § 353.48(b) (1986).
94. In Carlisle Tire & Rubber Co. v. United States, 634 F. Supp. 419, 422-24 (Ct. Int'l
Trade 1986), the court held that Commerce cannot automatically assume that all weighted
average dumping margins of less than 0.5% are de minimis. Rather, Commerce must analyze
the facts of each case to determine whether a margin of less than 0.5% is de minimis. Id.
Commerce has proposed a regulation incorporating a 0.5% de minimis test. 51 Fed. Reg.
35,529, 35,531 (1986) (to be codified at 19 C.F.R. pt. 353); see Color Television Receivers,
Except for Video Monitors, from Taiwan, 51 Fed. Reg. 37,317, 37,318 (Dep't Comm. 1986)
(prelim. admin. review) (applying the 0.5% test after Carlisle); Certain Iron Construction
Castings from India, 51 Fed. Reg. 9486, 9490 (Dep't Comm. 1986) (final determination)
(applying the 0.5% test prior to Carlisle).
95. 51 Fed. Reg. 29,064 (1986) (to be codified at 19 C.F.R. § 353.21(c)).
96. 19 C.F.R. § 355.36 (1986). For a discussion of Commerce's policy regarding the im-
position of company-specific countervailing duty rates, see Portland Hydraulic Cement &
Cement Clinker from Mexico, 50 Fed. Reg. 51,732-34 (Dep't Comm. 1985) (final affirmative
determination of administrative review).
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An antidumping duty marks the difference between the U.S. price and
the foreign market value. 97 The U.S. price is listed at either the purchase
price (if goods are sold prior to importation) or the exporter's sales price
(if goods are sold after importation). 98 Some parties believe the purchase
price is more favorable for respondents than the exporter's sales price.
In exporter's sales price sales, the amount of indirect selling expenses
that can be subtracted from the home market price is capped by U.S.
indirect selling expenses. 99 When sales are purchase price sales, however,
no cap is imposed. I°0
Lately, disputes have arisen as to what expenses can be deducted from
the gross price in exporter's sales price situations. In the proposed reg-
ulations, Commerce apparently is trying to give itself leeway to make
additional deductions from the exporter's sales price by omitting the re-
quirement that the only expenses properly deductible are those incurred
by or for the account of the exporter "in the United States." 101 At present,
adjustments to the exporter's sales price clearly must be incurred "in the
United States."' 10 2 By deleting the words "in the United States," Com-
merce arguably would have authority to deduct expenses not incurred in
the United States, such as credit expenses between a related exporter
and importer.
A countervailing duty marks the per unit value of the subsidies.
10 3
Disputes often arise about how various grants should be amortized and
how loans should be valued to arrive at a subsidy figure for a given year.
II. Settlement
Antidumping and countervailing duty investigations may be settled either
by withdrawal of the petition or a suspension agreement.
97. 19 U.S.C. § 1673e(a)(1) (1982).
98. Id. § 1677a(b), (c) (1982 & Supp. 11 1984).'Commerce's distinction between purchase
price and exporter's sales price transactions on the basis of whether merchandise is sold
before or after importation was questioned in PQ Corp. v. United States, No. 84-12-01709,
slip op. at 25 (Ct. Int'l Trade Jan. 27, 1987). That case dealt with the definition of purchase
price in effect prior to an amendment of the Trade and Tariff Act of 1984. Id. at 15. How
Commerce will distinguish purchase price and exporter's sales price transactions after the
1984 amendment is unclear.
99. 19 C.F.R. § 353.15(c) (1986).
100. For purchase price transactions, indirect selling expenses are not subtracted from
the gross U.S. or home market price. Id. § 353.10. Direct selling expenses are subtracted
from both the U.S. and home market gross price but there is no cap. Id.
101. See 51 Fed. Reg. 29,071 (1986) (to be codified at 19 C.F.R. § 353.41(e)(2)).
102. 19 C.F.R. § 353.10(e)(2) (1986).
103. 19 U.S.C. § 1671e(a)(i) (1982).
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A. WITHDRAWAL OF PETITION
The most common settlement method, withdrawal of the petition, pro-
vides the greatest flexibility because there are few statutory or regulatory
requirements. 104 Withdrawal of a petition at any stage in the investigation
terminates the investigation. 105 Commerce must give notice of withdrawal
to all parties and determine that withdrawal is in the public interest. 106
Voluntary restraint agreements (VRAs), whereby a foreign government
agrees to hold its exports to a certain level, result in withdrawal of the
petition. Although VRAs are negotiated government to government, the
petitioner in effect retains a veto over the final agreement since, if it finds
the agreement unsatisfactory, it may refuse to withdraw the petition. The
U.S. government usually cannot coerce a petitioner to accept an unfa-
vorable VRA, because if a petitioner refused to withdraw its petition and
Commerce issued a negative final determination, the petitioner undoubt-
edly would challenge that determination in the Court of International
Trade, arguing that it should have been affirmative. 107
Commerce must find that any quantitative restriction, such as an agree-
ment between the U.S. and a foreign government, is in the public inter-
est. 108 Thus far, Commerce has not taken this requirement seriously.
In negotiating a VRA or other quantitative restriction, a private com-
pany respondent must be wary of potential antitrust problems. Its par-
ticipation in the negotiations can only be through the foreign government.
B. SUSPENSION AGREEMENTS
A second settlement method involves entering into a suspension agree-
ment. The agreement is negotiated between the U.S. government and the
foreign government or exporters who account for substantially all of the
merchandise subject to investigation. 10 9 Since 1983, Commerce has been
increasingly unwilling to enter into suspension agreements except for
political reasons. Its rationale is that it cannot undertake the burden of
monitoring a suspension agreement given its heavy workload.
The proposed regulations contain numerous provisions affecting sus-
pension agreements and may indicate a rekindling of Commerce's interest
104. See id. §§ 1671c(a), 1673c(a) (1982 & Supp. 11 1984); 19 C.F.R. §§ 353.41(a), 355.30(d)
(1986).
105. 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671c(a), 1673c(a) (Supp. 11 1984). The International Trade Commission
can terminate an investigation by withdrawing the petition only after Commerce's prelim-
inary determination. Id.
106. 19 C.F.R. §§ 355.30(a), 353.41(a) (1986).
107. Presumably, if there were no margins or subsidies, the respondent would not accept
the VRA.
108. 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671c(a)(2), 1673c(a)(2) (Supp. 11 1984).
109. Id. §§ 1671c(b), 1673c(b) (1982).
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in this method of settlement. For example, under the current regulations,
the respondent and Commerce must reach a suspension agreement thirty
days prior to the proposed suspension. 110 Under the proposed regulations,
the respondent would submit the agreement to Commerce forty-five days
prior to the final determination.'I The proposed regulations would have
a cut-off date for comments five days before Commerce's final determi-
nation. 112 The present regulations do not provide for a cut-off date.
The proposed regulations also contain a provision that would allow
Commerce to revise a suspension agreement to include additional sig-
natory exporters if it decides that the agreement is no longer in the public
interest or no longer covers exporters who account for substantially all
of the merchandise. 113 Since it would not be in a nonsignatory exporter's
interest to enter into such an agreement, it is difficult to see how this
provision could be utilized. Commerce, perhaps, could threaten self-
initiation of an investigation to coerce a nonsignatory exporter to sign the
agreement.
Regarding the violation of a suspension agreement, the proposed reg-
ulations would clarify that violation means "significant noncompliance"
with the agreement. 114
IV. Administrative Review
If Commerce and the International Trade Commission make final affir-
mative determinations, the importer must pay a cash deposit on the im-
ported merchandise."t 5 One year after the issuance of the dumping or
countervailing duty order, Commerce, through the Office of Compliance,
will conduct an administrative review to determine the actual duty owed. 116
Then, based on that finding, the importer may owe duties in excess of
the deposits or receive a refund for some or all of the deposit.' 17 If the
cash deposits are less than the actual duties owed, the importer must pay
interest to Customs on the amount of the underpayment. 118 Conversely,
if the cash deposits are greater than the actual duties owed, Customs will
110. 19 C.F.R. § 355.31(h)(1), 353.42(h)(1) (1986).
111. 50 Fed. Reg. 24,223 (1985) (to be codified at 19 C.F.R. § 355.18(g)(I)); 51 Fed. Reg.
29,062 (1986) (to be codified at 19 C.F.R. § 353.18(g)(1)).
112. 50 Fed. Reg. 24,223 (1985) (to be codified at 19 C.F.R. § 355.18(g)(3)); 51 Fed. Reg.
29,062 (1986) (to be codified at 19 C.F.R. § 353.18(g)(3)).
113. 50 Fed. Reg. 24,224 (1985) (to be codified at 19 C.F.R. § 355.19(c)); 51 Fed. Reg.
29,063 (1986) (to be codified at 19 C.F.R. § 353.19(c)).
114. 50 Fed. Reg. 24.224 (1985) (to be codified at 19 C.F.R. § 355.19(d)); 51 Fed. Reg.
29,063 (1986) (to be codified at 19 C.F.R. § 353.19(d)).
115. 19 U.S.C. § 1671e. 1673e (1982 & Supp. 11 1984).
116. Id. § 1675; 19 C.F.R. § 353.53a(c) (1986).
117. Id.
118. 19 U.S.C. § 167lf(b), 1673f(b) (1982).
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pay interest on the overpayment. 119 Thus, if the importer halts the dump-
ing or subsidization when an order is issued, Customs, at Commerce's
directive, will refund all deposits, with interest.
A. REQUEST
Any interested party can make a request for an administrative review, 120
but only during the anniversary month of the publication of an antidumping
or countervailing duty order. 12 1 Failure to request a review means that
Commerce will direct Customs to assess a duty on the goods automat-
ically, as discussed above. Ironically, the request for a second adminis-
trative review becomes due before Commerce completes the first
administrative review. 122 After Commerce commences an administrative
review, it follows basically the same process as in an investigation.
B. AUTOMATIC ASSESSMENT OF DUTIES
If the interested parties fail to request an administrative review, both
existing and proposed regulations provide for Customs to assess duties
at rates equal to the cash deposit of (or bond for) estimated duties "at
the time of entry."' 123 Assessing duties based on the rate "at the time of
entry" is in violation of article 8(3) of the Anti-dumping Code of the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 124 because Customs can collect
duties at the preliminary determination rate even where that rate is higher
than the final determination rate. The Anti-dumping Code provides that
duties can be assessed only on the basis of final determinations. 125
119. Id.
120. 19 C.F.R. § 355.10(a)(I), 353.53a(a)(I) (1986).
121. Id. Making administrative reviews conditional upon a request to be submitted in a
certain month is one of the extensive changes Commerce made in the regulations because
of the Trade and Tariff Act of 1984. At that time, administrative reviews were seriously
backlogged, sometimes taking several years to be completed although the statute required
Commerce to complete reviews in one year. 19 U.S.C. §§ 167le(a)(1), 1673e(a)(1) (1982 &
Supp. i 1984). The Office of Compliance still is working to clear the backlog.
122. The deadline for completion of an administrative review is twelve months after the
month of Commerce's initiation of the review. 19 C.F.R. § 353.53a(c)(7) (1986). The initiation
must be published not later than ten days after the anniversary month. Id. § 353.53a(c)(l).
Hence, the first review will be completed thirteen months after the first anniversary month,
and the request for the second administrative review (in the second anniversary month) will
be due one month before the first review is complete.
123. 19 C.F.R. §§ 355.10(d), 353.53a(d) (1986); 50 Fed. Reg. 24,227 (to be codified at 19
C.F.R. § 355.22(g)); 51 Fed. Reg. 29,064 (1985) (to be codified at 19 C.F.R. § 353.22(e)).
124. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Agreement on Implementation of Article
VI, Apr. 12, 1979, art. 8(3), 31 U.S.T. 4919, 4932, T.I.A.S. No. 9650.
125. Id. Commerce takes the position that the authority for assessing duties based on
the preliminary determination arises from the legislative history of the Trade and Tariff Act
of 1984 which provides that "[t]he committee intends the administering authority should
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C. REVOCATION
Commerce does not revoke a dumping or countervailing duty order
until at least three years after the date the order was issued. 126 Thus,
including the time it takes for Commerce to complete an investigation and
administrative reviews, a respondent will be subject to Commerce's price
monitoring for four years if Commerce finds less than fair value or sub-
sidized sales during the investigation. If no "interested party" requests
an administrative review for four consecutive anniversary months, under
the proposed regulations, Commerce would commence revocation pro-
ceedings no later than the first day of the fifth anniversary month. 127 The
use of the term "interested party" rather than "domestic interested party"
means that a foreign exporter cannot request a new margin or subsidy
calculation during the four-year period or else the running of the four-
year period must start anew.
The proposed regulations have certification procedures for both dump-
ing and countervailing duty administrative reviews. For dumping cases,
a foreign producer or reseller would be required to certify that dumping
had ceased and that it would not sell at less than fair market value in the
future. 128 For countervailing duty cases, both the foreign government and
the foreign producer would have to submit certification. 129 If a company
certified that it was not receiving subsidies, but the foreign government
failed to provide a certificate, Commerce could not revoke the order for
five years rather than three years. 130 Thus, the five-year requirement
imposes an undue burden.
Another problem with the proposed countervailing duty revocation reg-
ulations involves the confusion concerning whether a foreign government
must certify the elimination of countervailable programs or the lack of a
present subsidy using Commerce's methodology.131 For example, even
though a foreign government might have terminated the countervailable
provide by regulation for the assessment of antidumping and countervailing duties on entries
for which review is not requested, including the elimination of suspension of liquidation,
and/or the conversion of cash deposits of estimated duties, previously ordered.'" H.R. CONF.
REP. No. 1156, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 181 (1984) (emphasis added).
126. A party may submit an application to revoke an order if there have been no sales
at less than fair market value or subsidized sales for two years. 19 C.F.R. §§ 355.42(b),
353.54(b) (1986). Because the reviews generally take at least a year to complete, the final
two administrative review determinations are not made until the third year after publication
of the order.
127. 50 Fed. Reg. 24,229 (1985) (to be codified at 19 C.F.R. § 355.25(d)(4)(i)); 51 Fed.
Reg. 29,066 (1986) (to be codified at 19 C.F.R. § 353.25(d)(4)(i)).
128. 51 Fed. Reg. 29,066 (1986) (to be codified at 19 C.F.R. § 353.25(b)(I)).
129. 50 Fed. Reg. 24,228 (1985) (to be codified at 19 C.F.R. § 355.25(b)).
130. Id. (to be codified at 19 C.F.R. § 355.25(a)(2)(i)).
131. See id. (to be codified at 19 C.F.R. § 355.25).
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program, a subsidy still could remain, because a payment in year one can
result in a subsidy in year five based on Commerce methodology. As a
matter of policy, requiring the latter certification is unwise because then
a foreign government would have little incentive to eliminate counter-
vailable programs.
Also, to revoke an order in part, Commerce must find it unlikely that
the companies covered by the order will apply for, or receive, a net subsidy
or sell at less than fair value in the future. 132 This provision gives Com-
merce discretion to deny revocation even if the affected companies meet
all of the regulatory criteria.
Commerce currently requires a company to undergo at least two of
three possible verifications before Commerce will revoke an order (as-
suming the dumping or subsidization ceased when an order was issued). 133
Under the proposed regulations, Commerce would have to conduct only
one of three verifications. 34 Therefore, it may be in a respondent's best
interest to submit complete and accurate questionnaire responses during
the initial investigation so that Commerce will exercise its discretion to
limit the number of verifications.
V. Conclusion
The proposed antidumping and countervailing duty regulations would
make Commerce procedures more transparent by codifying many rules
that are currently a matter of agency practice. In this respect, they would
be a boon to respondents.
Substantively, the proposed regulations would make it slightly more
difficult than it is at present for respondents to prevail in an antidumping
or countervailing duty investigation. It would become more difficult for
a company to raise standing objections, be excluded from an investigation,
maintain the confidentiality of information submitted, or achieve a settle-
ment. Furthermore, voluntary questionnaire responses probably would
not be accepted, and, if a duty were imposed, it could be more- difficult
to have the duty revoked.
132. 50 Fed. Reg. 24,228 (1985) (to be codified at 19 C.F.R. § 355.25(a)(3)(ii)); 51 Fed.
Reg. 29,066 (1986) (to be codified at 19 C.F.R. § 353.25(a)(2)(ii)).
133. If Commerce does not review promptly, there can be innumerable verifications. See,
e.g., Toshiba Corp. v. United States, No. 86-10-01285, slip op. at 2 (Ct. int'l Trade Mar. 2,
1987).
134. 50 Fed. Reg. 24,232 (1985) (to be codified at 19 C.F.R. § 355.37(a)(I)(iv)(B)); 51 Fed.
Reg. 29,069 (1986) (to be codified at 19 C.F.R. § 353.36(a)(l)(iv)(B)).
